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5Automatic stabilisers – describe how government budget 
policies, particularly income taxes and welfare spending, help 
to dampen fluctuations in real GDP by reducing the severity 
of recessions and of overheating during booms. For example, 
the requirement to pay taxes diminishes during a downturn 
in activity, while access to certain transfer benefits related 
to unemployment and education increases. Both occur 
without any explicit policy action by governments.
Discretionary fiscal policy – refers to explicit decisions by 
governments to change policy settings, thereby affecting 
budget aggregates. A discretionary tightening of fiscal 
policy either increases tax rates (and revenue) and/or 
reduces spending. Conversely, a discretionary loosening of 
fiscal policy either reduces tax rates (and revenue) and/ 
or raises spending.
Fiscal balance – an accrual measure of the overall budget 
position for a period that indicates whether a government 
has generated sufficient surplus to fund its operating 
requirements and capital expenditure (such as purchases of 
buildings and infrastructure). Conceptually, this measures the 
Australian Government’s investment-savings (net lending) 
balance, or contribution to the current account on the 
balance of payments.
General government sector – those public sector agencies 
which mainly provide non market goods and services to the 
public, paid for indirectly by taxpayers.
Headline cash balance – the underlying cash balance (see 
page 8), plus net cash flows from investments in financial 
assets for policy purposes (for example, payments related 
to the construction of the National Broadband Network).
Net operating balance – an accrual measure of the sustainability 
of government operations indicating whether a government 
has enough revenue to cover its operating requirements. 
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Structural cash balance – a measure of the overall budget 
position based on adjusting certain line items which 
constitute the underlying cash balance for the impact of 
movements away from long run trend economic activity 
and long-run average commodity prices. The measure 
attempts to remove the influence of cyclical factors and 
automatic stabilisers from the budget balance while 
capturing discretionary policy influences.
Underlying cash balance – a measure of the overall budget 
position that comprises all the cash received from operating 
activities and from sales and purchases of non-financial 
assets, less finance leases and similar arrangements. 
Conceptually similar to the fiscal balance (an accrual 
measure), it will differ in any given period as it makes no 
allowance for non-cash (such as depreciation).
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9The sustainability of fiscal settings 
and the efficiency of individual 
budget measures help to support 
consumer and investor confidence, 
to ensure governments do their job 
cost-effectively and, ultimately, to 
assist rising living standards.
A central theme of this Monograph 
is that effective fiscal rules can 
guide budget behaviours around a 
sustainable benchmark, provided 
that benchmark is properly 
specified and clearly identified. The 
combination of transparency and 
high-quality information can assist 
political acceptance of the need for 
budget discipline, without removing 
necessary fiscal flexibility.
The experience of Australian 
economic reform over the last 
three decades supports this insight. 
Australia had seen its relative 
economic performance decline 
by the 1980s and arresting this 
trend required an effective mix of 
microeconomic and macroeconomic 
reforms pursued by successive 
Australian Governments, at least 
up to 2000. On the fiscal policy 
front, this meant tackling the 
accumulation of historically-high 
levels of Commonwealth (and state 
and territory) net debt. 
Policy reformers argued that 
improving the long-term credibility 
of policy settings would underpin 
strong and stable economic growth. 
The idea was that fiscal policy 
was felt most strongly through 
stabilising debt and national 
savings, via related confidence 
effects attached to the risk premia 
on interest rates and allocative 
efficiency improvements. In 1998, 
the Howard Government enacted 
the Charter of Budget Honesty 
reforms which required the explicit 
outlining of a “medium-term” fiscal 
strategy. The practicalities of this 
involved a fiscal strategy statement 
being included from the 1997-98 
Budget onwards, nominating a 
target objective for the strategy. 
Executive summary
The conduct of fiscal policy as part of overall macroeconomic 
management is essential to underpinning growth and stability  
in the Australian economy. 
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This objective was defined loosely 
as maintaining budget balance, 
on average, over the course 
of the economic cycle. It was 
operationalised by successive 
governments as running a net 
lending underlying cash balance 
over the economic cycle. Certain 
economic outcomes were seen as 
flowing from the fiscal strategy, at 
least in theory. The strategy should:
•	 ensure the level of net debt 
remains stable in nominal 
terms over time so that, as the 
economy grows, net debt falls as 
a proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP); 
•	 improve Australia’s public saving 
performance leading to a higher 
national saving position which 
improves longer-term growth 
prospects, everything else  
being equal;
•	 avoid the need to borrow in net 
terms from financial markets over 
the cycle, facilitating lower real 
interest rates (on average) by 
removing the Government’s call 
on private and foreign saving and 
by maintaining the confidence of 
financial markets, thereby helping 
to minimise the risk premium 
component of interest rates; 
•	 ensure Australia’s current account 
deficit is a result of private 
savings and investment decisions, 
which are subject to market 
disciplines; and 
•	 allow the automatic stabilisers 
of the budget to operate so 
enhancing the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy in supporting 
demand during a downturn, 
while providing an anchor for 
discretionary policy responses.
But there was one major flaw in 
the medium-term strategy. After a 
strong start in the late 1990s, that 
flaw was exposed by the “China 
Boom” from 2003-04. 
Australian Governments were 
presented with windfall tax 
revenue receipts year-after-year 
based on income flows from 
higher mineral commodity exports. 
Macroeconomics estimates that 
commodity boom windfall revenues 
contributed around $160 billion  
to the Commonwealth budget 
bottom-line up to 2011-12.
Yet all that the fiscal strategy 
required was for governments 
to run budget surpluses in good 
economic times. There was no 
acknowledgement of the windfall 
element of tax revenues under the 
strategy and no tally kept of the 
magnitude of these impacts on 
the budget. Successive Australian 
Governments were free to engage 
in fiscal largesse while still meeting 
their fiscal strategy objective. 
Essentially, the fiscal strategy 
objective provided the wrong 
diagnostic tool as a benchmark 
for success over the business and 
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commodity cycle. As a result, 
governments spent up big in the 
boom and got caught on the down 
side of the cycle. Windfall tax 
receipts were frittered away. By 
2006-07, the Commonwealth was 
running a structural budget deficit 
(based on adjustment of the official 
budget balance for movements in 
the real economy and the terms of 
trade). This structural budget deficit 
has widened subsequently. In the 
process, the Commonwealth has 
accumulated more than $170 billion 
in budget deficits, with another 
deficit now in prospect for 2012-13. 
Ten years on from the start 
of the China Boom, it is clear 
that Australia’s fiscal strategy 
is in need of an overhaul. Even 
more concerning has been the 
degree to which the nation’s 
fiscal sustainability has been 
compromised by a failure to 
maintain appropriate fiscal  
discipline in the “boom years”.
Firstly, the nation’s fiscal strategy 
needs to be re-oriented around 
a structural budget measure to 
take account of movements in the 
business and commodity cycle 
and to provide both policy makers 
and the public with a realistic 
assessment of the underlying 
position of the budget.
Secondly, reforms are needed to 
reverse the impact of unsustainable 
commitments made in boom years 
Ten years on 
from the start of 
the China Boom, 
it is clear that 
Australia’s fiscal 
strategy is in need 
of an overhaul.
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and to meet future fiscal challenges. 
Of course, Australian Governments 
must balance the goal of restoring 
the sustainability of budget settings 
with that of achieving short-term 
macroeconomic stability. The task of 
repairing the structural budget need 
not compromise the role of fiscal 
policy in mitigating the impact of the 
economic cycle on living standards.
This Monograph sets out why 
Australia needs a new roadmap 
for fiscal sustainability and outlines 
some key budget reforms to secure 
future fiscal sustainability.
Section 2 provides an assessment 
by Macroeconomics of the fiscal 
outlook ahead of the 2013-14 
Budget, including structural budget 
numbers and projections of the 
medium to longer term budget 
position. The Commonwealth 
budget is estimated to be in 
underlying cash deficit of around 
0.8 per cent of GDP ($11.6 billion) 
in 2012-13, with similar moderate 
deficits over the outlook period 
finishing with a deficit of 
 $14.3 billion in 2016-17. 
The structural cash deficit is more 
concerning in the near term (close 
to $41 billion in 2012-13, or around 
2.7 per cent of GDP) and, despite 
some improvement over the outlook 
period due to the Government’s 
real spending cap, Macroeconomics 
finds no sustainable return to 
surplus over the next few years 
without the imposition of one-off 
budget cuts of around 1 per cent 
of GDP or a sustained period of 
restrained spending growth at a 
rate below growth in the economy.
By the middle of the next decade, 
the budget is projected to still 
record a moderate structural deficit 
(around 0.7 per cent of GDP by 
2024-25) even if the Australian 
Government manages to restrain 
spending for around a decade. 
Looking even further ahead to 
the middle of the century, the 
projection for the Commonwealth 
budget is for a structural cash 
deficit equal to around 5.6 per cent 
of GDP by 2056-57, due mostly 
to the susceptibility of a limited 
number of Australian Government 
spending programs to demographic 
change associated with population 
ageing and rising costs of health 
technology.
Section 3 examines Commonwealth 
fiscal sustainability based on 
a deeper analysis of historical 
spending trends. It shows that 
growth in public spending has 
outstripped economic growth in 
Australia over the past 50 years.  
As a result, Commonwealth 
spending as a share of GDP has 
risen from 17.5 per cent in the 1960s 
to 25.5 per cent in the 2000s, while 
the total tax burden has risen  
from 19.1 per cent of GDP to  
24.9 per cent of GDP. 
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Since 1990-91, trend real spending 
growth has exceeded 4 per cent 
per annum, accelerating in the 
2000s funded by windfall tax 
revenues. The Howard Government 
engaged in a major discretionary 
loosening of fiscal policy over its 
last five budgets. Even allowing for 
a one-off stimulus in the face of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 
Rudd-Gillard Governments have 
also tended to outspend savings 
efforts, while continuing to raise 
expectations for future spending.  
As a result, the risk is that Australia’s 
medium-term structural budget 
deficit could deteriorate further 
based on new spending priorities 
and longer term spending pressures.
Section 4 explains why long-term 
budget reform is needed in light 
of the large structural hole now 
in the budget and the burdens 
identified by three Intergenerational 
Reports (IGRs). Without such 
reform, Australia remains exposed 
to another global financial shock 
at the same time as poor quality 
spending undermines national 
productivity and living standards. A 
strategic review of the sustainability 
of Commonwealth spending is 
long overdue and this should occur 
alongside further improvements in 
budget transparency. 
Section 5 outlines five pro-growth 
budget reforms which would go 
a long way to laying the basis for 
long-term fiscal sustainability. 
They are:
1.	Anchoring the medium - term 
fiscal strategy to a measure of 
the structural budget balance, 
while building in capacity for 
appropriate fiscal flexibility.
2.	Eliminating up to $15 billion in 
poorly-targeted outlays from the 
spending base.
3.	Unifying welfare benefit 
payments under one broad 
payment, combining the current 
multiplicity of benefit abatement 
ranges into a single, more 
efficient and effective measure.
4.	Conducting a considered public 
review of sustainable budget 
spending issues.
5.	Introducing a new Budget 
Paper devoted solely to 
spending program performance 
assessment.
The thrust of these reforms is to 
identify effective performance 
benchmarks and to employ 
transparent, high-quality public 
reporting frameworks. These 
reforms are necessary to assist policy 
makers charged with maintaining 
long-term fiscal sustainability in the 
face of inherent pressures for more 
and more public spending. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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This section provides an assessment of the Commonwealth 
fiscal outlook for the general government sector ahead of the 
2013-14 Budget to be tabled on 14 May 2013. It also provides 
structural budget estimates and projections of the medium to 
longer term budget position.
SECTION 1
Budget trends and outlook
These estimates and projections are 
based on economic and fiscal data 
released prior to mid-March 2013 
and assume no policy change since 
the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal 
Outlook (MYEFO) update released 
in October 2012.
Budget outlook
Macroeconomics’ budget tracking 
model has the Commonwealth 
budget in underlying cash deficit by 
$11.6 billion dollars (around 0.8 per 
cent of GDP) in 2012-13 (Chart 1). This 
is a $13 billion deterioration compared 
with the 2012-13 MYEFO due in 
large part to a shortfall in expected 
business tax receipts of $7 billion, 
including as a result of a more rapid 
than expected decline in the prices 
of Australian mineral commodities.
Budget forecasts comparisonChart 1
■ Treasury      ■ Macroeconomics
Source: Macroeconomics estimates and Budget Papers
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While the MYEFO Budget Outlook 
projected small surpluses rising 
in size over the fiscal out-years, 
Macroeconomics expects the 
Australian Government to run 
moderate deficits of at least 
0.5 per cent of GDP over the outlook 
period finishing with a deficit of  
$14.3 billion dollars in 2016-17 (Table 1). 
As a result, general government  
net debt is expected to rise to 
around $157 billion (10.2 per cent  
of GDP) in 2012-13 and continue 
rising to around $206 billion 
(11.4 per cent of GDP) by 2016-17 
(Chart 2). In contrast, the MYEFO 
had net debt falling to around  
$138 billion in 2015-16.
Actual Estimates Projections
2011-12 
$b 
2012-13 
$b 
2013-14 
$b 
2014-15 
$b 
2015-16 
$b 
2016-17 
$b 
Underlying cash surplus -43.7 -11.6 -8.3 -9.2 -12.2 -14.3
Percentage of GDP -3.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
Net debt 142.5 156.7 167.8 180.1 192.2 206.3
Percentage of GDP 9.7 10.2 10.6 10.9 11.1 11.4
 Source:  Budget Papers and Macroeconomics estimates. Subject to rounding.
Key budget aggregates - General governmentTable 1
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Structural budget position
The Australian Government 
structural underlying cash budget 
position – that is, the budget 
position adjusted for the impact of 
the real business cycle and terms 
of trade – is more concerning in 
the near term. Macroeconomics’ 
structural budget balance model 
suggests a Commonwealth 
structural cash deficit of over  
$41 billion in 2012-13 (around  
2.7 per cent of GDP). The structural 
budget position is projected to 
improve over the forward estimates 
period with the deficit expected to 
be around $21 billion (or 1.2 per cent  
of GDP) in 2016-17 (Chart 3). 
Relatively high commodity prices 
(at least compared with the long-
run average prior to 2003) are 
still contributing windfall budget 
revenues to the underlying cash 
position, estimated on average at 
around $26 billion in each year of 
the outlook period. As such, they 
continue to underpin any hope the 
Gillard Government has of returning 
the budget to surplus, even if those 
surpluses are not sustainable. 
Official international forecasts of 
the structual net lending position 
by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) more or less 
track Macroeconomics’ structural 
model estimates for the the past 
decade, although they show a more 
rapid improvement in the structural 
budget from 2012-13 onwards. 
Given these measures are based on 
the total general government sector 
(not just central goverment), they 
are not directly comparable.   
Structural budget balance (alternate measures)Chart 3
Source: Macroeconomics estimates, OECD Economic Outlook No. 92 and IMF country statistcs
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Nor do they appear to adjust 
adequately for the commodity cycle. 
As a result, the Macroeconomics 
measure shows a more gradual 
path for the discretionary policy 
adjustment by the Australian 
Government, with measures of the 
OECD and the IMF appearing more 
variable over time.
The Macroeconomics structural 
balance measure continues to show  
a deficit of around $21 billion (or 
1.2 per cent of GDP) by 2016-17 
(Table 2). This suggests there will 
be no sustainable return to surplus 
without the imposition of one-off 
budget cuts of around 1 per cent 
of GDP or a sustained period of 
restrained spending growth at a 
rate below growth in the economy. 
The structural budget position 
has improved in part due to the 
Treasurer’s real spending cap 
of 2 per cent which, if realised, 
will help to curb the growth of 
discretionary spending. However, if 
this commitment is breached each 
percentage point of additional real 
discretionary spending growth 
would add around $4 billion to the 
structural deficit in 2016-17 dollars. 
Any return to more “typical” levels 
of real spending growth would likely 
see structural deficits in excess of 
$30 billion (around 2 per cent of 
GDP) for the rest of the decade.
Actual Estimates Projections
2011-12 
$b 
2012-13 
$b 
2013-14 
$b 
2014-15 
$b 
2015-16 
$b 
2016-17 
$b 
Underlying cash balance -43.7 -11.6 -8.3 -9.2 -12.2 -14.3
Impact of the economic cycle 15.1 4.2 8.7 15.5 12.6 9.8
Impact of the commodity cycle -36.0 -33.9 -29.1 -27.3 -22.6 -16.7
Structural balance -64.7 -41.3 -28.8 -21.1 -22.2 -21.3
Percentage of GDP -4.4 -2.7 -1.8 -1.3 -1.3 -1.2
 Source:  Budget Papers and Macroeconomics estimates. Subject to rounding.
Commonwealth underlying cash and structural budget positionTable 2
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Medium-term outlook
Looking beyond the forward 
estimates period, the underlying 
cash budget will not return to 
surplus by the middle of the next 
decade without discretionary 
spending cuts, even if average 
annual real spending growth can be 
kept below 2 per cent to 2015-16 and 
below 2.5 per cent beyond 2016-17 
(Chart 4). Some historical context 
for this assumption is provided in 
the next section. Such low spending 
growth has not been achieved by 
Australian Governments for any 
sustained period of time over the last 
50 years. Hence, these projections 
may be considered optimistic.
...there will be no 
sustainable return 
to surplus without 
the imposition of 
one-off budget cuts 
of around 1 per cent 
of GDP.
Underlying cash budget projections to 2026-27Chart 4
Source: Budget papers and Macroeconomics estimates and projections
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Moreover, even if Australian 
Governments manage to restrain 
spending for around a decade, there 
will still be a small structural deficit 
of just below 0.7 per cent of GDP  
by 2024-25 (Chart 5).
Longer term outlook
Looking even further ahead 
towards the middle of the century, 
Macroeconomics’ revenue and 
expenditure projections suggest 
there is no possibility that existing 
policy settings will allow for average 
real spending growth rates below  
3 per cent each year. This is due 
mostly to the susceptibility of a 
limited number of large Australian 
Government spending programs 
to demographic change associated 
with population ageing and rising 
costs of health technology.
The Macroeconomics long-term 
projection of the Commonwealth 
Budget is for a structural cash 
deficit equal to around 5.6 per 
cent of GDP by 2056-57. In the 
2010 Intergenerational Report, 
Treasury forecast a Commonwealth 
underlying cash deficit of around  
3.8 per cent in 2049-50. 
Structural budget balance projections to 2026-27Chart 5
Source: Macroeconomics estimates and projections
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Structural cash balance projections to 2056-57Chart 6
Source: Macroeconomics estimates and projections
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When assessing overall fiscal 
sustainability and the sustainability 
of public spending over time, a 
useful benchmark is to compare 
the growth rate of public spending 
to that of the economy (using 
comparable real or nominal growth 
rates). Government spending is 
generally held to be sustainable 
provided it does not grow faster 
than the economy. 
However, some important caveats 
to this general rule should be kept 
in mind.
•	Just targeting the growth rate 
of spending ignores the quality 
of existing and new spending, as 
well as other issues such as the 
best way to manage key policy 
challenges such as the impacts of 
an ageing population.
•	As living standards in society rise, 
it could be argued that the size of 
government should fall in output 
terms over time. Most categories 
of government expenditure 
are driven by program-specific 
demand and/or indexation which 
policy makers can control. Most 
of these factors should grow 
more slowly than the economy 
over time, so the spending share 
of GDP should fall.
•	In theory, a government 
spending/GDP ratio should 
emerge from a bottom-up, 
“evidence-based” approach 
to budget policy through 
Cabinet processes such as the 
Expenditure Review Committee.1 
Needless to say, there has been 
little sign of evidence-based 
policy in recent years. The 
absence of such policy making 
has highlighted the need for 
greater transparency and more 
useful information as part of a 
medium-term fiscal strategy.
SECTION 2
Real spending: A deeper analysis
This section examines Commonwealth general government 
spending in both historical and forward-looking terms. In the 
process, it probes more deeply into some of the longer term 
drivers of the looming fiscal gap in the budget.
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When public spending grows at, 
or below, the rate of growth in the 
economy over time, the size of 
government should not rise, the 
tax burden should not increase and 
governments should not run deficits 
or accrue public debt (which is a 
form of deferred taxation).2 Table 
3 illustrates the reality. For most of 
the past 50 years, both nominal and 
real public spending growth has 
outstripped growth in the economy. 
Consequently, spending as a share 
of GDP has risen from 17.5 per cent 
in the 1960s to 25.5 per cent in the 
2000s. At the same time, the total 
tax burden has risen from 19.1 per 
cent of GDP to 24.9 per cent of GDP.
1961-62 to 
1970-71
% 
1971-72 to 
1980-81
% 
1981-82 to 
1990-91
% 
1991-92 to 
2000-01
% 
2001-02 to 
2010-11
% 
Economic growth
Nominal 9.6 14.3 10.6 5.5 7.1
Real 5.7 3.0 3.1 3.6 3.1
Spending growth
Nominal 10.4 17.4 10.9 6.3 7.2
Real 7.6 6.7 3.0 4.0 4.4
Share of GDP
Total spending 17.5 21.9 25.0 24.8 25.5
Total revenue 19.1 21.7 23.7 23.6 24.9
 Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics and Macroeconomics estimates. Subject to rounding.
Assessing the sustainability of Australian general government spendingTable 3
For most of the  
past 50 years, 
both nominal 
and real public 
spending growth 
has outstripped 
growth in the 
economy.
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Despite periods of restraint, the 
long-run track record of Federal 
Government expenditure control 
is not strong. For example, since 
1991-92 trend real spending growth 
has remained above 4 per cent 
per year, exceeding growth in the 
real economy which has averaged 
around 3.3 per cent annually.3 
Whether the increasing size of 
government has weakened growth 
prospects is a matter of debate. The 
Federal Treasury has argued that 
the optimal size of government is 
not a question that can be answered 
by technical economic analysis.4 Yet 
there is strong international evidence 
that an overly large and growing size 
of government is not conducive to 
growth or rising living standards.5 The 
main reason is that the welfare loss 
from growth in the public sector rises 
exponentially with increases in the 
tax burden. Hence, it is reasonable 
to conclude that living standards in 
Australia will be impacted adversely 
if the size of government is not 
stabilised over time. 
Historical drivers of spending 
growth 
Since the 1960s, expenditures on 
social security, health and education 
have been key drivers of growth in 
the Commonwealth Government 
spending share of the economy. 
Between the 1960s and 2000s, 
the share of total budget spending 
on social security and welfare 
payments has risen from 23 per cent 
to 37 per cent (Table 4). 
1961-62 to 
1970-71
% 
1971-72 to 
1980-81
% 
1981-82 to 
1990-91
% 
1991-92 to 
2000-01
% 
2001-02 to 
2010-11
% 
Social security  
and welfare (total) 23.4 29.9 31.7 37.7 37.3
Average real growth 4.0 12.0 4.2 5.9 3.3
Income support  
in total 22.7 28.6 29.5 33.9 32.3
Average real growth 3.8 11.9 3.6 5.6 2.9
Welfare services  
for the aged 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.8
Average real growth 9.8 15.0 15.2 23.6 8.1
 Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics and Macroeconomics estimates. Subject to rounding.
Growth in the social security budgetTable 4
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A more detailed picture of the 
growth of social security payments 
category areas over the last decade 
is provided in Table 5. 
Another major source of 
expenditure growth has been health 
spending which has risen from 7.6 
per cent to 15.9 per cent of total 
spending since the early 1960s, 
and grown by 5.4 per cent in real 
terms over the last decade alone 
(Table 6). Key drivers of recent 
growth in the health budget are 
community health service programs 
(including Medicare and the 
Private Health Insurance rebate), 
public health service programs 
(population health, hearing services, 
blood products, e-Health etc.), the 
Pharmaceuticals Benefits Scheme 
and medical research funding. 
Real growth 
2001-02 to 2010-11
% 
Total budget share 
2010-11
% 
Assistance to the aged 3.2 12.5
Assistance to veterans and dependants -0.1 2.0
Assistance to people with disabilities 8.2 5.8
Assistance to families with children 3.8 8.8
Assistance to unemployed and sick -0.1 2.0
Common youth allowance -0.9 0.0
Other welfare programs 54.7 0.6
Aboriginal advancement n.e.c. (not elsewhere classified) -1.9 0.3
General administration 2.9 0.9
Total social security 3.3 32.9
 Source: Australian Government Final Budget Outcomes
Social security expenditure by categoryTable 5
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1961-62 to 
1970-71
% 
1971-72 to 
1980-81
% 
1981-82 to 
1990-91
% 
1991-92 to 
2000-01
% 
2001-02 to 
2010-11
% 
Health spending share 
(% of budget) 7.6 10.8 12.6 15.0 15.9
Average real growth 8.4 18.2 6.1 4.8 5.4
Other community 
health services 1.3 2.7 3.9 5.3 6.1
Average real growth 12.9 17.8 12.7 5.4 5.9
Admitted patient 
services in acute care 
institutions
2.7 4.5 5.1 4.8 4.3
Average real growth 4.8 46.3 2.3 2.3 3.4
Pharmaceuticals, 
medical aids and 
appliances
2.7 1.9 1.3 2.2 3.0
Average real growth 6.7 -2.4 5.7 11.9 4.8
Public health services 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.4
Average real growth 4.7 40.5 -14.4 43.0 12.9
Health research (total) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7
Average real growth 8.4 19.9 13.8 19.4 14.3
 Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics and Macroeconomics estimates. Subject to rounding.
Growth in the health budgetTable 6
Other key drivers of the rising 
Commonwealth general government 
spending share over recent years are 
summarised in Table 7. While total 
spending on education has declined 
slightly in recent decades, spending 
on primary and secondary education 
is growing by around 7.6 per cent 
in real terms. Even higher growth 
rates have been seen in the “Other 
economic affairs” programs of the 
budget which relate primarily to 
labour market assistance and asylum 
seekers. Fuel and energy programs 
have also had strong growth in 
the last decade due to the mining 
boom.6 This trend will likely reverse 
over the next decade as growth in 
the mining sector diminishes from 
historically high levels.
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Projected spending growth over 
the longer term
The Macroeconomics long-term 
projection of the Commonwealth 
budget is for a structural cash deficit 
equal to around 5.6 per cent of GDP 
by 2056-57. This projection relies on 
line-item modelling of most revenue 
and expenditure items. 
This longer term modelling is 
predicated on three key assumptions 
over the projection period:
•	real GDP growth averaging  
2.5 per cent;
•	a productivity growth rate of  
1.6 per cent; and
•	an inflation rate of 2.5 per cent.7
On the expenditure side, the 
assumed real annual growth rate in 
most spending categories is around 
2.1 per cent. However, certain high-
growth categories are projected to 
grow by rates in excess of 2.1 per 
cent based on current and future 
growth pressures. Key results are 
presented in Table 8. 
1961-62 to 
1970-71
% 
1971-72 to 
1980-81
% 
1981-82 to 
1990-91
% 
1991-92 to 
2000-01
% 
2001-02 to 
2010-11
% 
Education (total) 3.0 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.5
Average real growth 19.7 78.4 1.5 2.3 10.1
Primary and secondary 
education n.e.c 0.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.4
Average real growth 62.2 9.9 2.1 5.4 7.6
Other economic affairs 
(total) 1.1 1.7 2.3 2.6 2.2
Average real growth 9.2 12.7 5.7 3.1 9.3
Fuel and energy 
(total) 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.9
Average real growth 2.3 14.6 12.4 16.0 7.3
 Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics special request and Macroeconomics estimates. Subject to rounding.
Other growth areas in the budgetTable 7
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Overall, average real spending is 
projected to increase by around 
3.0 per cent per annum over the 
period. Health expenditure is the 
dominant driver of spending growth 
based on real average growth of 
around 4.9 per cent per annum over 
the projection period. This is driven 
by growth in excess of 5 per cent 
in each of the key sub-functions: 
namely, Medical services and 
benefits, Hospital services, National 
health and hospitals network, 
Pharmaceutical services and 
benefits and Health services. 
Remaining areas of high-growth risk 
in the modelling include Assistance to 
the aged, Government superannuation 
benefits and Public debt interest.
Functional spending categories
Long-term trend 
Nominal
% 
Long-term trend 
Real
% 
General public services
Government superannuation benefits 7.6 5.1
Health
Medical services and benefits 7.9 5.4
Hospital services 8.0 5.4
National health and hospitals network 8.0 5.4
Pharmaceutical services and benefits 8.0 5.5
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health 7.2 4.7
Health services 7.9 5.4
General administration 4.7 2.1
Health assistance to the aged 7.7 5.2
Total health 7.4 4.9
Social security
Assistance to the aged 7.7 5.2
Assistance to people with disabilities 5.9 3.4
Assistance to families with children 5.5 3.0
Total social security 6.4 2.9
Public debt interest
Interest on the Australian Government’s behalf 7.0 4.5
 Source: Macroeconomics estimates. Subject to rounding.
Longer term spending growth projectionsTable 8
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Underpinning these 
intergenerational projections 
by Macroeconomics is the 
“optimistic” assumption that 
future governments can keep 
spending growth below 2.1 per cent 
across most portfolios in an era of 
subdued economic growth, while 
also keeping expenditure growth 
in high-growth portfolios (such 
as health) at manageable levels. If 
this discipline can be maintained, 
then the modelling outcome of a 
structural cash deficit equivalent to 
5.6 per cent of GDP by 2056-57 is a 
worst case scenario.
However, a key message from 
these longer term projections is 
that governments must actively 
manage those spending programs 
with real growth rates in excess of 
3 per cent annually, while balancing 
new spending commitments by 
eliminating underperforming 
programs. This requires much 
greater fiscal discipline and 
managerial attention than has been 
displayed in the past.
The Australian Government’s 
recent track record on 
expenditure control 
How successful has the Federal 
Government been in controlling 
discretionary spending in 
recent times? Analysis by 
Macroeconomics, based on the 
expenditure reconciliation tables 
in Budget Paper No.1, suggests 
...governments 
must actively 
manage those 
spending programs 
with real growth 
rates in excess of 
3 per cent annually, 
while balancing 
new spending 
commitments 
by eliminating 
underperforming 
programs.
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that in five budget rounds since 
coming to office the Rudd-Gillard 
Governments have generated 
new net discretionary spending 
(including fixed assets purchases) 
totalling $153 billion. This includes 
temporary GFC Mark I stimulus 
spending worth around $70 billion.
Hence, we find a net increase in 
policy spending of around $83 billion 
over five years.8 Higher spending was 
funded partly by higher discretionary 
revenues (taxation and charges) of 
around $72 billion over five years, 
with the remainder “funded” by 
higher public net debt. Thus the 
Rudd-Gillard Governments have 
failed to impose strict control over 
discretionary policy. Rather, they 
have relied on future growth to fund 
additional spending. 
A comparable analysis of the last 
five budget rounds of the Howard 
Government reveals an even poorer 
performance, with net discretionary 
spending of around $133 billion over 
five years. Note that this period also 
witnessed net discretionary tax cuts 
of around $117 billion. Of course, 
this major discretionary loosening 
in fiscal policy was funded mostly 
by windfall business tax revenue 
increases driven by the China Boom.
Ironically, policy spending has 
been largely pro-cyclical since 
the mid-2000s, often providing 
stimulus to support an already 
strong economy, while the more 
recent withdrawal of stimulus has 
coincided with softening activity. 
One lesson from this period is that 
an activist fiscal policy must be 
applied symmetrically through the 
business cycle. In other words, years 
of high spending and deficits must 
be offset by years of lower spending 
and surpluses. The alternative (less 
activist) approach would be for 
governments to maintain a tight rein 
on policy spending and allow the 
automatic stabilisers of the budget 
to help stabilise the business cycle.
Treasurer Swan often refers to 
the extensive budget “savings” 
achieved by the Labor Government. 
In reality, these include revenue 
measures while further confusion 
is sown by reference only to gross 
savings (which are more than offset 
by other spending decisions). The 
Treasurer can claim to have enacted 
some crucial longer term structural 
budget reforms, including:
•	increasing the pension age to  
67 by 2023;
•	piecemeal tightening of the family 
payments system;
•	means testing of the private 
health insurance rebate;
•	reforms to personal tax offsets 
(such as the net medical expenses 
offset and dependent spouse tax 
offset); and
•	means testing for aged care 
recipients.
However, the central problem 
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with the Rudd-Gillard era has 
been the tendency to outspend 
savings efforts, while continuing 
to raise expectations about future 
government spending. The list of 
aspirational commitments is long and 
getting longer. It now includes the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(NDIS), Gonski education reforms, 
top-up in wages for low-paid social 
workers, and a 12 ship submarine 
build program for South Australia.
The Treasurer has also erred 
with some crucial reforms, 
including linking the raising of the 
Superannuation Guarantee to 12 per 
cent to the Minerals Resource Rent 
Tax (MRRT). In this case, the value 
of the concession will rise over time 
with the value of superannuation 
assets, while the supposed funding 
source for the concession relies on 
the value of two key commodity 
prices remaining well above their 
long-run average levels. Previous 
modelling by Macroeconomics 
suggests the gap between these 
two sources could reach around  
$6 billion by 2019-20. 
A key plank of the Gillard 
Government’s fiscal strategy is the  
robustness of the Treasurer’s real 
spending cap announced in February 
2009. The idea was to assist the 
structural repair of the budget by 
keeping spending growth low, while 
allowing tax receipts to recover 
gradually from the GFC. The crux 
of this approach was to spread the 
adjustment burden over many years, 
rather than undertake a discretionary 
fiscal tightening in one hit. 
The modelling in this paper does 
anticipate that from 2012-13 onward 
the Treasurer will manage to 
achieve his real spending growth 
target. The Macroeconomics’ 
budget model predicts low average 
real growth in the base spending 
rate at 1.5 per cent, on average, over 
each year of the forward estimates 
to 2016-17 (Table 9). If achieved, 
this real spending profile will lead 
to a significant lowering in the 
structural deficit. 
However, our modelling does not 
include any new policy spending. 
In other words, new aspirational 
spending programs such as the 
NDIS and Gonski will have to be 
fully offset. This sounds too good 
to be true and is a key reason 
why the Australian Government’s 
structural budget deficit is likely to 
rise. The strategy is also very risky 
because one poor budget outcome 
can jeopardise its feasibility over 
time. The track record of Australian 
Governments over recent decades 
suggests that a once-and-for-all 
adjustment may be a more  
effective strategy. 
Finally, the Australian Government 
budget is also impacted strongly by 
tax concessions (large and small) 
which reduce the taxable incomes 
37
Actual Estimates Projections
2011-12 
$b 
2012-13 
$b 
2013-14 
$b 
2014-15 
$b 
2015-16 
$b 
2016-17 
$b 
Payments spending base 371.0 362.2 383.9 403.1 423.9 449.5
Real growth in payments 
(CPI deflator) [%]
4.9 -4.8 3.7 2.5 2.7 3.5
Receipts base 329.9 353.7 378.7 396.7 414.7 437.2
Real growth in receipts 
(CPI deflator) [%]
7.9 4.8 4.8 2.2 2.0 2.9
Margins of receipts 
growth over payments 3.0 9.6 1.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6
Budget balance -43.7 -11.6 -8.3 -9.2 -12.2 -14.3
 Source:  Budget Papers and Macroeconomics estimates. 
Real spending and receipts growth under the Rudd-Gillard GovernmentTable 9
and tax payable by households or 
business. The 2012 Tax Expenditure 
Statement details 363 income tax 
concessions which collectively cost 
the budget $111 billion (or around 
one third of budget revenue) 
before account is taken of likely 
behavioural impacts which reduce 
these estimates.9 
Some of the larger concessions, 
including those related to taxes 
on employer superannuation 
contributions and on super earnings, 
collectively cost around $32 billion in 
2011-12, before behavioural responses 
were allowed for. Treasury estimates 
they are likely to grow by more 
than 5 per cent per annum over 
the next 20 years and therefore 
represent a further budget risk. All 
of the concessions should be treated 
in the same way as direct budget 
expenditures for the purposes of 
program evaluation and the merits 
of each concession should be 
periodically re-established. 
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By various estimates, the Commonwealth budget will remain 
in structural deficit in 2012-13.10 And Australian Governments 
– Federal and state/territory – are already on a trajectory to 
accumulate total public sector financial liabilities exceeding 
$700 billion in 2016-17 (around 40 per cent of GDP).
SECTION 3 
The case for long-term budget reform
An economic downturn would 
see the government sector in 
Australia more rapidly accumulate 
public debt and be exposed to 
global debt markets at a time 
when the foundations of global 
macroeconomic policy remain 
compromised. Global monetary 
policy is leading to asset 
misallocation (as central banks of 
major economies continue to grow 
their balance sheets to provide relief 
to stagnant economies), a situation 
compounded if governments 
consume valuable investable funds.11 
Government debt when combined 
with high household indebtedness, 
which though moderating recently 
is still expected to be around 
$600 billion (around 34 per cent of 
GDP) in 2016-17, implies a genuine 
risk that credit ratings agencies 
will look hard at sovereign risk in 
the Australian economy. While 
credit ratings agencies usually only 
track public indebtedness once 
it rises above 70 per cent of GDP, 
Australia’s high level of private 
indebtedness and exposure to 
residential real estate presents 
a potential risk in the face of 
another global financial shock. The 
government sector must do more 
to contribute to net national savings 
to guarantee the steady inflow of 
foreign capital needed to build the 
plant and infrastructure that will 
grow prosperity. 
In terms of longer term fiscal 
sustainability, the burdens identified 
in three Intergenerational Reports 
loom larger each year.12 Without 
policy change, taxation revenue 
will largely track GDP growth in 
coming decades, while government 
expenditure is likely to rise more 
rapidly, placing budgets under 
considerable pressure. 
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As noted above, in the 2010 IGR 
Treasury forecast a Commonwealth 
underlying cash deficit due to 
population ageing of around  
3.8 per cent of GDP in 2049-50, 
with the gap opening towards 
the end of the next decade.13 
Macroeconomics estimates the 
gap will be around 5.6 per cent by 
2056-57. In addition, governments 
at the state and local levels in 
Australia will carry a fiscal burden 
from population ageing which is 
expected to add around 1.5 per cent 
of GDP to the overall burden 
according to a 2005 study by the 
Productivity Commission.14
Added to this prospect, certain 
longer term risks to the Federal 
budget are not subject to scrutiny 
in the IGR. They include longer term 
environmental risks and challenges 
associated with defence capital. 
For example, the project cost 
of building 12 diesel submarines 
at TechPort in South Australia is 
expected to be in excess of  
$100 billion.
When taken together – current 
public indebtedness, the Australian 
Government’s structural deficit, 
intergenerational pressures and 
other longer term spending 
commitments – the future scenario 
is one of higher public debt and/
or higher taxes as a share of GDP 
in the absence of concerted fiscal 
consolidation.15
The future 
scenario is one 
of higher public 
debt and/or 
higher taxes as 
a share of GDP 
in the absence of 
concerted fiscal 
consolidation.
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Effective rules can guide better 
budget decision-making
A central theme of this Monograph 
is that effective fiscal rules can 
guide budget behaviours around a 
sustainable benchmark, provided 
that benchmark is properly 
specified and clearly identified. The 
combination of transparency and 
high-quality information can assist 
political acceptance of the need for 
budget discipline, without removing 
necessary fiscal flexibility.
The experience of Australian 
economic reform over the last 
three decades supports this insight. 
Australia had seen its relative 
economic performance decline 
by the 1980s and arresting this 
trend required an effective mix 
of microeconomic reforms and 
macroeconomic policy pursued by 
successive Australian Governments, 
at least up to 2000. On the fiscal 
policy front, this meant tackling the 
accumulation of historically-high 
levels of Commonwealth (and state 
and territory) net debt. 
Policy reformers argued that 
improving the long-term credibility 
of policy settings would underpin 
strong and stable economic growth. 
The idea was that fiscal policy 
was felt most strongly through 
stabilising debt and national 
savings, via related confidence 
effects attached to the risk premia 
on interest rates and allocative 
efficiency improvements. In 1998, 
the Howard Government enacted 
the Charter of Budget Honesty 
reforms which required the explicit 
outlining of a medium-term fiscal 
strategy. The practicalities of this 
involved a fiscal strategy statement 
being included from the 1997-98 
Budget onwards, nominating a 
target objective for the strategy. 
This objective was defined loosely 
as maintaining budget balance, 
on average, over the course 
of the economic cycle. It was 
operationalised by successive 
governments as running a net 
lending underlying cash balance 
over the economic cycle. Certain 
economic outcomes were seen as 
flowing from the fiscal strategy, at 
least in theory. The strategy should:
•	 ensure the level of net debt 
remains stable in nominal 
terms over time so that as the 
economy grows, net debt falls as 
a proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP); 
•	 improve Australia’s public  
saving performance leading to 
a higher national saving position 
which improves longer term 
growth prospects, everything 
else being equal;
•	 avoid the need to borrow in net 
terms from financial markets over 
the cycle, facilitating lower real 
interest rates (on average) by 
removing the Government’s call 
on private and foreign saving and 
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by maintaining the confidence of 
financial markets, thereby helping 
to minimise the risk premium 
component of interest rates; 
•	 ensure Australia’s current account 
deficit is a result of private 
savings and investment decisions, 
which are subject to market 
disciplines; and 
•	 allow the automatic stabilisers 
of the budget to operate so 
enhancing the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy in supporting 
demand during a downturn, 
while providing an anchor for 
discretionary policy responses.
But there was one major flaw in 
the medium-term strategy. After a 
strong start in the late 1990s, that 
flaw was exposed by the China 
Boom from 2003-04. 
Australian Governments were 
presented with windfall tax revenue 
receipts year-after-year based on 
income flows from higher mineral 
commodity exports. Yet all that 
the fiscal strategy required was 
for governments to run budget 
surpluses in good economic times. 
There was no acknowledgement of 
the windfall element of tax revenues 
under the strategy and no tally 
kept of the magnitude of these 
impacts on the budget. Successive 
governments were free to engage 
in fiscal largesse while still meeting 
their fiscal strategy objective. 
Essentially, the fiscal strategy 
objective provided the wrong 
diagnostic tool as a benchmark 
for success over the business 
and commodity cycle. As a result, 
governments spent up big in 
the boom and got caught on the 
down side of the cycle. Windfall 
tax receipts were frittered away. 
By 2006-07, the Commonwealth 
was running a structural budget 
deficit. This structural budget deficit 
has widened subsequently. In the 
process, the Commonwealth has 
accumulated more than $170 billion 
in budget deficits, with another 
deficit now in prospect for 2012-13. 
Ten years on from the start 
of the China Boom, it is clear 
that Australia’s fiscal strategy 
is in need of an overhaul. Even 
more concerning has been the 
degree to which the nation’s 
fiscal sustainability has been 
compromised by a failure to 
maintain appropriate fiscal discipline 
in the “boom years”.
Firstly, the nation’s fiscal strategy 
needs to be re-oriented around 
a structural budget measure to 
take account of movements in the 
business and commodity cycle 
and to provide both policy makers 
and the public with a realistic 
assessment of the underlying 
position of the budget.
Secondly, reforms are needed to 
reverse the impact of unsustainable 
commitments made in boom years 
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and to meet future fiscal challenges. 
Of course, Australian Governments 
must balance the goal of restoring 
the sustainability of budget settings 
with that of achieving short-term 
macroeconomic stability. The task of 
repairing the structural budget need 
not compromise the role of fiscal 
policy in mitigating the impact of the 
economic cycle on living standards.
Review of the spending base is 
long overdue
A strategic review of the 
sustainability of Commonwealth 
spending is well and truly overdue. 
The last time there was a so-
called “root and branch” review 
of Commonwealth Government 
expenditure was following 
the election of the Howard 
Government.16 The National 
Commission of Audit undertook 
a broad-ranging review of 
government direct spending, tax 
expenditures and capital purchases, 
as well as of budget reforms. Yet 
even the National Commission of 
Audit was not a complete review of 
spending issues in the sense that it 
was undertaken over a three month 
period. Thus there was hardly time 
to conduct a thorough examination 
in each area.
The National Commission of Audit 
paved the way for spending cuts in 
the first and second Howard-Costello 
Budgets (1996-97 and 1997-98) 
of between 0.5 to 1 per cent of 
GDP. These budget cuts did little 
for the Canberra property market, 
but seemed to spur the domestic 
economy in concert with lower official 
interest rates and a lower exchange 
rate (following the Asian financial 
crisis). Since the late 1990s, various 
piecemeal review processes have 
been conducted through normal 
budget processes, but nothing 
that has provided such a strategic 
framework or such wide coverage.
Given the precarious fiscal position 
of the Commonwealth and that 
nearly two decades have passed 
since the Commission of Audit, it is 
time for an Australian Government 
to undertake another broad review. 
Ideally, it should comprise a panel 
of eminent Australians with a 
strong background in economic 
analysis and extensive knowledge 
of the internal workings of the 
budget process. A string a recent 
state reviews (including those 
undertaken by the ACT, South 
Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, NSW 
and Queensland) may provide some 
valuable lessons.
The tendency in recent years for 
government to throw money at policy 
problems as if that was some sort of 
cure-all needs to be systematically 
reversed. As Gary Banks, then 
Chairman of the Productivity 
Commission, observed in 2009 
“Australia’s productivity slump was 
not caused by any lack of spending 
on education and training, R&D or 
even infrastructure”.17 Unfortunately, 
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the Australian Government’s existing 
spending review processes are 
piecemeal, without an overarching 
strategic framework. 
A better budget system would 
assess all spending priorities 
side-by-side, specifying feasible 
real policy outcomes in advance, 
and allocating base spending 
according to which programs 
have the highest expected rate 
of economic and social return. 
Each year, each program would 
be evaluated to assess whether 
outcomes were being achieved and, 
if necessary, modified or terminated 
– with resources shifted to higher 
performing areas. 
The illusion of transparency
Any careful review of 
Commonwealth or state Budget 
Papers reveals there is very little 
information provided about the 
things that taxpayers actually care 
about when it comes to spending. 
For example, you will find almost 
no meaningful discussion of the 
following questions:
•	What are the names of all 
government spending programs 
and what is each supposed to 
achieve (on current reckoning 
there are more than 550 
Commonwealth programs)?
•	How much has government spent 
on each program since its inception 
and what has that delivered in 
terms of policy outcomes? 
•	How much does government 
plan to spend on each program 
in the future and what should 
that spending deliver in terms of 
policy outcomes?
•	What resources are required to 
deliver each program in terms of 
staffing levels and departmental 
outlays?
•	Are there alternative programs 
(either in Australia or overseas) 
which may be more efficient and/
or effective in achieving particular 
objectives?
•	How does each program rate in 
comparison with other programs 
in terms of overall effectiveness 
and value for money?
•	How would an independent 
expert rate the program’s overall 
performance and productivity? 
Program-based performance 
reporting would be a fundamental 
transparency check on 
governments. Yet it has been a very 
long time (since the mid to late 
1980s) since this information was 
included in budget documentation. 
Unfortunately, program-specific 
budget estimates were basically 
abolished and removed from Budget 
Papers in 1998-99 with the start of 
accrual accounting.18 As a result, the 
public can find lots of accounting 
data in Budget Papers, but very little 
information that is actually useful in 
assessing the policy performance of 
government programs.19 
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Taxpayers should possess tools that 
allow them to assess for themselves 
the adequacy and efficiency of 
government spending programs. In 
other words, they need a budget 
document that provides a “clear 
read” between program budget 
estimates and outcomes, including 
policy performance information and 
appropriate historical information. 
This would be a genuine transparency 
reform, one that would help to 
make the operation of government 
more accessible, assessable and 
accountable to the public. 
Without this level of analysis, 
Budget Papers tend to create the 
illusion of transparency, rather 
than the reality. Ministers and/
or senior public servants for the 
most part are not held accountable 
for the adequacy and efficiency 
of public resource use. And most 
parliamentary processes (such as 
Senate Estimates hearings) become 
exercises in futility.
Lax expenditure control  
can undermine productivity  
and growth
Genuine waste or spending on areas 
with low economic and/or social 
returns has no lasting impact on 
the national economy (debt stock 
and public debt interest aside). By 
contrast, public investment which 
leaves households, public agencies 
and private firms better placed to 
contribute to economic and social 
outcomes raises productivity. 
Budget Papers  
tend to create 
the illusion of 
transparency,  
rather than  
the reality.
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Maintaining a tight rein on public 
spending also helps to drive 
dynamic efficiency gains over time, 
helping to keep costs down, to 
accelerate innovation and to raise 
growth rates.
Fiscal consolidation can also be 
expansionary in an open economy 
if it contracts public consumption 
expenditure.20 This may seem 
counterintuitive, but if foreign 
investors respond to tighter 
budgets by lowering the required 
return on their lending, then 
domestic interest rates will tend to 
be lower, as will the exchange rate. 
This will help to promote private 
investment and exports. 
Australian policy makers 
could exploit this channel by 
demonstrating their intention to 
tighten policy settings as part of 
a coherent medium -term fiscal 
strategy which improves the 
structural position of the budget 
and lowers the future tax burden. 
So while the direct demand impact 
of fiscal austerity is negative in 
most instances, the net effect 
may be positive via the impact 
on expectations which underpin 
investor sentiment and lower 
risk premia.21 Some significant 
international studies support the 
possible expansionary impacts 
from fiscal tightening in certain 
instances, especially where there is 
a perception that fiscal policy has 
been mismanaged.22 Perhaps even 
more importantly, maintaining a 
tight rein on public spending allows 
more room for easing of monetary 
policy which tends to magnify 
positive impacts on key variables.23 
For example, supportive monetary 
and fiscal policy settings seemed 
to help the Australian economy 
avoid recession during the Asian 
financial crisis. A rapid depreciation 
of the currency enabled Australian 
exporters to enhance their 
competitiveness, while tight fiscal 
policy supported low interest 
rates and a pick-up in business 
investment. As noted above, the 
Howard Government’s net spending 
cuts amounted to between 0.5 to 
1 per cent of GDP, with one study 
concluding that GDP growth was 
around ¾ of a percentage point 
higher over two to three years after 
the budget cuts.24 
Another example is the “Banana 
Republic” episode in the mid-1980s, 
when the exchange rate came 
under pressure from lower terms 
of trade. Again, a subsequent fiscal 
consolidation did not appear to 
impact adversely on growth:
•	 the 1987-88 Budget cut real 
policy outlays by 1.2 per cent of 
GDP in 1987-88 and 0.6 per cent 
in 1988-89; and 
•	 the 1988-89 Budget cut real 
policy outlays by 2.2 per cent of 
GDP in 1988-89 and a further 0.3 
per cent of GDP in 1989-90.25 
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Genuine waste or spending on 
areas with low economic and/or 
social returns for whatever reason 
means that the community is 
worse off because higher valued 
priorities, whether they be spending 
on schools, hospitals, medical 
technology or aged care facilities, 
or even tax cuts, are crowded 
out. Real strategic spending cuts 
should actually benefit the nation 
by helping to raise the quality 
of spending overall and so assist 
productivity. The real enemy 
of quality public services is not 
spending cuts, but needless waste.
Reforming fiscal strategy, spending 
priorities and budget frameworks 
are all examples of “no regrets” 
policy making. They are worth 
doing in and of themselves in order 
to improve use of resources in the 
economy, regardless of some of the 
wider economic dividends likely to 
flow in the form of lower long-term 
real interest rates, higher investment 
and higher productivity. 
At the same time, even small 
gains in terms of productivity and 
lower risk premia can generate 
big output effects. For example, 
Macroeconomics’ general 
equilibrium model of the Australian 
economy finds that:
•	 a ½ of a percentage point 
reduction in the risk premium raises 
GDP around ¼ of a percentage 
point after two years; and
•	 a ½ of a percentage point increase 
in total factor productivity raises 
GDP around 1 percentage point 
after two years.26 
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This section outlines five fiscal reforms that would help to 
underpin economic growth in the Australian economy and put the 
Commonwealth budget on a more sustainable long-term footing.
SECTION 4
Five pro-growth budget reforms
Reform 1: Anchoring fiscal 
strategy (while preserving 
flexibility) 
The Australian Government’s 
medium-term fiscal policy of 
achieving budget balance, on 
average, over the economic cycle 
has been in place since the mid- to 
late 1990s. It helped to achieve 
reasonable budget outcomes for 
the first few years. In particular, it 
encouraged:
1. Transparency, as high-level 
fiscal benchmarks were at the 
centre of public debate.
2. Sustainability, as the strategy 
helped to reinforce the need for 
governments to add to national 
savings by running surpluses 
when activity was above trend.
3. Flexibility, in the sense that it 
does not force “hard and fast” 
rules on reluctant governments 
with their independent policy 
objectives.27
Undoubtedly, however, the 
performance of the fiscal strategy 
has been less impressive since the 
beginning of the commodity price 
boom in 2003-04.
•	over the period 1994-95 to  
2003-04, Australia achieved 
a modest cumulative budget 
surplus totalling $5.7 billion
•	over the period 2004-05 to  
2011-12, Australia has achieved 
large cumulative deficits totalling 
$79 billion (remembering that  
the GFC stimulus totalled  
around $70 billion)
•	over the past four years to 2011-12, 
Australia has accumulated deficits 
of over $172 billion.
Australia’s fiscal performance 
should have been better over the 
period from 2004-05. Successive 
governments had the benefit of  
the commodity boom revenue 
windfalls which contributed around  
$160 billion to the budget bottom-
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line up to 2011-12. Certainly, the GFC 
and its aftermath had a significant 
cyclical impact on taxation revenues, 
mainly through lower business tax 
receipts. But the truth is successive 
governments used the proceeds of 
the China Boom to fund a significant 
loosening in discretionary policy. 
Little structural reform was achieved. 
If successive Australian Governments 
from 2004 had linked the medium-
term fiscal strategy to the structural 
budget balance position (allowing for 
the real business cycle and terms of 
trade) then the gradual deterioration 
in the structural budget position 
from the mid-2000s would have 
been transparent in budget papers 
and perhaps public opinion would 
have helped to limit the subsequent 
discretionary policy easing which 
frittered away revenues from the 
mining boom. 
Unfortunately, the Australian 
Government’s medium-term fiscal 
strategy:
•	provided no guide as to the 
suitable size of the budget 
balance given current economic 
circumstances;
•	provided no guidance regarding 
the target range of ideal budget 
balances given the stage of 
the real business cycle and 
commodity cycle; and 
•	provided no measure of the 
structural budget balance even 
though the Commonwealth 
Treasury has a structural model in 
place for internal use.28
For those who think this is all 
simply with the benefit of 20:20 
hindsight, there were individuals 
back in 2004 and 2005 (including 
Ross Garnaut, Saul Eslake and 
Chris Richardson) who warned the 
Howard Government of the need to 
tighten fiscal stategy in the face of 
the mining boom.29
Yet from 2004-05 onwards, 
successive Commonwealth budgets 
did the opposite of that which 
was required for responsible fiscal 
management. Nor did Treasury 
or any other official agency make 
any attempt to quantify the size 
of windfalls or alert the public to a 
once-in-a-lifetime event that was 
propping up bad budget decision 
making. This strengthens the case 
for making the structural position of 
the budget more transparent so that 
such poor management will receive 
closer scrutiny in future. 
A key reform, therefore, is for the 
Commonwealth (and even state 
governments) to include a structural 
budget measure as part of the budget 
outlook and to specify achieving 
a structural budget balance as 
part of the fiscal strategy.30 This 
would promote greater public 
understanding of the magnitude 
of temporary factors impacting the 
budget bottom line in any given 
period and help to reveal a more 
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accurate picture of the underlying 
condition of public finances. 
Over time, such an initiative would 
help to restore the structural 
foundations of the Australian 
Government’s budget, or at least 
arrest the decline. It would also be a 
useful transparency step to have the 
structural budget balance estimates 
reviewed by the new Parliamentary 
Budget Office (PBO) at the end of 
each budget update. Alternatively, 
the PBO could release its own 
structural budget balance estimates, 
complete with confidence intervals 
and ranges incorporating the 
sensitivity of their structural 
budget model to various parameter 
assumptions.
As part of a more tightly-specified 
fiscal strategy, the Australian 
Government should also consider 
introducing a size of government 
sub-objective tied to the long-run 
tax to GDP ratio. Currently, the size 
of government objective specifies 
a tax share target of no more than 
23.7 per cent of GDP based on the 
2006-07 outcome, prior to the last 
change of government. However, 
this period coincided with the height 
of the mining boom when revenue 
was inflated and so is an unrealistic 
benchmark. A better outcome 
would be to target a long-run 
average such as the tax share of 
the last 50 years. That suggests a 
target closer to 22.1 per cent of GDP. 
The point is that the Australian 
Government should align its 
spending objectives to a sustainable 
revenue share objective over the 
longer term, whatever that may be.
A more clearly specified fiscal 
strategy need not compromise the 
capacity for fiscal stimulus in the 
event of a major economic downturn. 
Hence an added dimension to the 
fiscal strategy would be for the 
Australian Government to enshrine 
its capacity to undertake a 2 to 3 per 
cent of GDP fiscal stimulus under 
certain circumstances (essentially 
the total size of the initial GFC fiscal 
stimulus). At the moment, the 
Australian Government has much 
less capacity than it did in 2008 to 
deliver a large stimulus. 
Having to acknowledge this reality 
might in itself spur corrective action. 
Government might also consider 
setting in place a dedicated “rainy day” 
fund with a specific savings target to 
pre-fund the stimulus objective and 
put in place necessary safeguards to 
prevent this fund being raided. 
The Australian Government could 
also demonstrate its preparedness 
for an economic downturn by 
specifying sensible policy reforms 
that would be rolled out in the event 
of a downturn requiring budget 
stimulus. For example, specific 
taxation reforms and high-value 
infrastructure projects could be 
included in an attachment to the 
budget outlook each year. The 
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Productivity Commission could be 
charged with producing a list of 
reforms and ranking them in order 
of merit. The policy implementation 
unit in the Prime Minister’s 
department could be charged with 
the job of ensuring that each policy 
could be enacted within a few weeks 
of an economic downturn justifying 
a discretionary easing in policy. 
Looking ahead over the next 40 
years, it makes sense to take 
corrective measures today to 
manage a fiscal gap which is well 
understood and likely to occur in 
coming years. It appears certain 
that Commonwealth and state 
governments will face a combined 
fiscal gap in the order of 5 to 6 per 
cent of GDP, before allowing for 
significant funding commitments 
such as the NDIS, the Gonski 
education reforms, national dental 
schemes and the like. Making some 
small provision each year to meet 
future deficits (say less than 0.4 
per cent of GDP) would probably 
be sufficient to pre-fund most of 
the fiscal deficit if governments act 
immediately. 
Of course, the benefits of immediate 
action compound such that speedy 
action is preferred. Intergenerational 
prefunding is fair provided that the 
same taxpayers who bear the burden 
benefit from a sustainable aged 
care and health system in the future. 
Governments should undertake 
preventive expenditure program 
Looking ahead  
over the next 40 years, 
it makes sense to take 
corrective measures 
today to manage a 
fiscal gap which is 
well understood and 
likely to occur in 
coming years.
57
reforms in high-growth areas to 
mitigate future outlays, as well as 
undertaking farsighted economic 
reforms to grow the future economy.31 
Reform 2: Eliminating wasteful 
spending and tax concessions
The most obvious way to control 
spending pressures is to cut areas 
of waste or profligacy. Certain other 
government programs require 
adjustment because they are so 
poorly targeted.  
Some clear savings can be made by 
focusing on the following areas. 
•	Alternative energy development 
programs operated by the 
Commonwealth remain in need 
of reform. As Gary Banks has 
noted, it is not clear why we 
have a $10 billion Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation, a $3.2 billion 
Renewable Energy Agency and 
a $200 million Clean Technology 
Innovation Program. Total savings 
from administrative consolidation 
of these programs could be 
worth as much as $100 million to 
the budget bottom-line.
•	The First Home Owners Grant 
is a scheme which pays eligible 
homebuyers $7,000 for 
purchasing an established home, 
or $14,000 for purchasing a new 
home. It was introduced by the 
Howard Government to provide 
compensation for GST on the cost 
of home purchases. The grant 
adds pressure on house prices 
while doing nothing to assist 
supply; hence making housing 
less affordable. Most states have 
similar schemes which exacerbate 
the distortion. The total cost 
per year to taxpayers of this 
concession has been estimated at 
around $771 million in 2013-14.
•	Staff levels in the Federal Health 
and Education Departments were 
4,759 and 4,738, respectively, in 
2011-12. It is not clear why these 
departments need so many 
staff when neither is involved in 
service delivery. Reorganising 
these agencies on an economic 
basis could save around $249 
million in 2014-15.
•	The budget estimates make 
provision for irrigation 
infrastructure purchases and 
water buy-backs up to $4.7 billion 
in 2015-16. Much of this spending 
is simply a handout to irrigators 
with no requirement for full cost 
recovery on the beneficiaries of 
new infrastructure.
•	The Commonwealth procures 
around $8 billion in capital 
equipment and buildings each year 
through multi-year engineering 
projects. None of these contracts 
include explicit incentives which 
allow the contactors to benefit if 
they save money for the Australian 
Government.32 Why not use 
contract incentives? Governments 
could save a risk margin of 
anywhere between 1 to 10 per cent 
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on Defence procurement each 
year, with annual savings between 
$80 million and $800 million in 
2013-14.33
•	The tax-free treatment of 
superannuation income lets 
senior Australians pay only $5.80 
for prescription drugs compared 
with $35.40 for someone on the 
minimum wage of $30,000. This 
is true even if the senior earns $1 
million in superannuation income. 
This is because super income is 
exempt from the $50,000 means 
test for the seniors’ health card. 
This is estimated to yield a total 
saving for taxpayers of around 
$28 million in 2013-14.34
•	Overstaffing in certain program 
delivery agencies is a significant 
budget impost. In 2011-12, the 
Defence Materiel Organisation 
had 5,592 workers and AusAID a 
further 1,887 workers. Governments 
should look to deliver policy 
administration in these areas 
through smaller, more technically-
focused teams. Reducing staff in 
these agencies by half would save 
around $390 million in 2013-14.
•	The School Kids Bonus pays 
parents of school aged children 
either $410 or $820 per year for 
each of their primary or secondary 
school aged children based on 
eligibility for other family tax 
transfers. The Bonus replaced 
the Education Tax Refund that 
was previously claimed through 
the tax system and was always 
undersubscribed. The Bonus 
does not require families to 
keep receipts and has no link to 
education spending. The total 
saving per year to taxpayers from 
abolishing this program would be 
around $1.2 billion in 2013-14.
•	The budget estimates include 
provision for the Caring for 
Country program of up to 
$2 billion over five years. This is 
an example of a poorly targeted 
community grants scheme, like 
the former Natural Heritage 
Trust, that provides the Minister 
with enough discretion to direct 
funding for political objectives. 
•	Family Tax Benefit B grants extra 
assistance to families where one 
parent chooses to stay home 
and look after the children. At 
the moment, households with 
incomes of up to $175,000 can 
still receive some level of benefit. 
Reducing this threshold to 
$120,000 would save around  
$811 million in 2013-14.
Reform 3: Better targeting 
of welfare policies (including 
corporate welfare)
More comprehensive reform of 
Federal spending requires renewed 
government focus on household 
assistance payments and corporate 
welfare. As noted earlier, as a 
share of the total budget, Federal 
spending on social security has risen 
by around 14 percentage points 
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since the 1960s. In many ways, the 
tendency towards “entitlement 
politics” has worsened since the 
mid-2000s when the Howard 
Government became prone to 
gifting benefits to certain groups 
without a strong policy case. 
One approach to social security 
reform would be to unify benefit 
payments under one broad 
payment, combining the current 
multiplicity of benefit abatement 
ranges into a single, more easily 
understood measure. An agency 
such as Treasury’s Retirement 
Income Modelling unit could be 
charged with developing options 
to establish a unified means test for 
welfare benefits aimed at targeting 
genuine economic hardship in all its 
forms. A revenue-neutral variant of 
this reform would be a significant 
microeconomic reform that would 
raise incentives for workplace 
participation whilst more effectively 
targeting need. In the process, it 
could fund personal tax cuts, while 
removing significant layers of welfare 
benefit payments and reducing 
inefficient churn in the tax system.
More should also be done to reduce 
corporate welfare, with industry 
subsidies costing Australian 
taxpayers around $18 billion 
each year. Most of this is paid 
out to uncompetitive or declining 
industries such as the car industry. 
Payments typically have no linkage 
to policy outcomes or structural 
adjustment that might raise 
competitiveness. Nor in many cases 
is assistance time-limited. 
Assistance should only be used to 
overcome some identifiable market 
failure and all levels of government 
should be made to publish subsidies 
paid to each Australian industry by 
firm, together with the effective 
rate of assistance provided to each 
sector by spending program.
Reform 4: A sustainability review 
of all spending programs
Another key strategic focus should be 
the evaluation of all existing spending 
programs employing a “zero base” 
approach – in other words, assess 
the merits of all programs from the 
first dollar, no matter how long they 
have been in place. 
The overarching focus of this review 
process would be sustainability. 
This would not be a one-off 
exercise in finding savings. Rather, 
it would take the time to access 
the relative performance of each 
spending program and set up 
performance benchmarks to assess 
the desirability of new spending 
proposals relative to base spending. 
Benchmarks should assess the 
efficiency and effectiveness 
of spending programs, with all 
programs reviewed in one cycle so 
that consistent comparisons can 
be made. Any such activity would 
necessarily take longer than a 
Commission of Audit review.
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In terms of the examination of 
new spending proposals, the 
Department of Finance could be 
given a mandate to conduct cost-
benefit analysis on all new policy 
proposals above $50 million. At 
the moment, similar requirements 
(such as rules relating to regulatory 
impact statements) can be 
breached by Ministers with no 
consequence. One option would be 
for the Charter of Budget Honesty 
Act to be amended to require that 
every new spending proposal 
worth more than $50 million in 
a single year be subject to a full 
cost-benefit analysis conducted 
by an independent expert agency 
prior to receiving Cabinet approval. 
Sponsoring Ministers who breached 
this requirement could be made to 
face the equivalent of disclosure 
penalties faced by a director of a 
public company director under 
corporations law.
Reform 5: A Budget Paper 
devoted to spending 
performance assessment
A comprehensive reform of 
Australian Government spending 
would require formal review of base 
spending worth around $370 million, 
or 25 per cent of GDP in 2011-12. 
As argued here, such a process is 
long overdue and would normally 
include establishing an expert panel 
to review all major administered 
spending and tax concession 
programs, departmental outlays, 
capital budgets and the staffing 
level of each major agency. The 
effectiveness of budget rules and 
processes would also need to be 
assessed. 
At the same time, it would be helpful 
to have certain agencies perform 
supportive analytical tasks including:
•	 have the Department of Finance 
score the performance of all 
government programs based 
on criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness; 
•	 have Treasury score the 
performance of all tax expenditures 
based on the same criteria; 
•	 have the Productivity Commission 
develop an independent 
measure of the productivity of 
large agencies such as Defence 
and Health with a view to 
benchmarking public service 
performance standards; 
•	 have an independent external 
body map public sector staffing 
levels back to the core business 
activities of each government 
agency. For example, the Federal 
Treasury’s core business is 
macroeconomic and revenue 
policy and forecasting. Those 
activities should employ around 
150 staff, but the agency now has 
roughly another 740 staff. The 
key to efficiency would be to tie 
public sector employment to the 
efficient delivery of core business 
activities; and
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•	 have the Productivity 
Commission examine the 
adequacy of public spending 
on capital so as to establish 
whether existing levels of public 
investment are adequate.35
A final important transparency 
reform to ensure ongoing 
effectiveness and efficiency of 
spending program delivery would 
be for the Australian Government 
to introduce a new Budget Paper 
(Budget Paper No. 6) to report 
estimates and actual outcomes 
for all government spending by 
portfolio. This document could 
provide a brief assessment of each 
program performance and so would 
help inform the public if there were 
ongoing problems in a particular 
area that require reform. 
A new budget statement would 
ensure that each department put in 
place a list of meaningful programs 
linked to the budget appropriations 
framework, with performance 
measures based on value for money 
criteria. The Australian Government 
could then extend this reporting 
framework to the states and 
territories by linking all recurrent 
and capital grants paid to (and 
through) each jurisdiction to the 
adoption of similar performance 
reporting standards via Council of 
Australian Government processes. 
The philosophy behind a 
consolidated expenditure program 
performance review statement is 
that the review processes should be 
ongoing, with fine-tuning occurring 
each year if problems arise. The 
standard approach at the moment 
is to call in the Auditor General 
when a problem has become too 
serious to ignore. Surely, it is better 
to maintain a state of continuous 
review and avoid ever having to 
solve major problems.
In addition, a new Budget Paper 
No. 6 should include information on 
the Top 20 long-term growth risks. 
These are spending programs and 
tax expenditures expected to have 
long-term growth in excess of  
4 per cent per year. 
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The Australian Government’s fiscal strategy is in need of 
comprehensive reform, the primary aim of which should be  
to return the Federal budget to a sustainable footing and to  
keep it there.
SECTION 5
Conclusion
Effective fiscal rules can support this 
objective through an appropriately 
specified, sustainable benchmark. 
The combination of greater 
transparency and high-quality 
information can help to guide budget 
decision-making processes towards 
necessary outcomes, not least by 
assisting political acceptance of 
appropriate budget discipline.
This Monograph outlines five specific 
reforms which can provide part of 
the necessary policy architecture for 
returning the Federal budget to a 
sustainable position through time.
The key indicator of fiscal strategy 
performance should be the 
structural underlying cash balance, 
to reveal how fiscal strategy 
performance is tracking abstracting 
from the business cycle and trade 
cycle. The China Boom which 
began in 2003-04 exposed flaws 
in the existing medium-term fiscal 
strategy as developed in the 1990s. 
Australian Governments were 
presented with windfall tax 
revenue receipts year-after-year 
and the simple underlying cash 
balance objective was the wrong 
diagnostic tool for assessing fiscal 
policy success. As a result, there 
has been a marked deterioration 
in the structural foundations of the 
Commonwealth budget position.
Additional reforms are now 
needed to reverse the impact of 
unsustainable commitments made 
in the boom years and to meet 
future fiscal challenges. Without 
such reform, Australia remains 
exposed to global financial shocks, 
while poor quality spending in itself 
undermines long-term growth in 
productivity and living standards. 
CONCLUSION
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Endnotes
1 An evidence-based approach to budget policy making ideally needs to pass 
through seven stages:
  I. Identify the “problem”
  II. Provide a case for government intervention
  III. Identify the objectives of government intervention
  IV. List the policy options for addressing the problem (in addition to  
 doing nothing)
  V. Assess the options according to their merits
  VI. Make policy decision
  VII. Monitor the impacts of the policy decision.
2 Public debt has a role in helping government to smooth out variations 
in revenue and expenditure caused by the business cycle and to fund 
the acquisition of necessary “lumpy” public infrastructure purchases 
which generate sufficient economic and social returns, but which are 
underprovided by the private sector. 
3 Kirsty Laurie and Jason McDonald, 2008, provide a very detailed overview of 
Commonwealth spending trends with a focus on the Howard Government era.
4 Ken Henry, 2009, p.12.
5 Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht, 2000 and Atul Dar and Sal Amir Khalkhali, 
2002, pp. 679-692.
6 The fuel tax credit scheme designed to reduce or remove a tax on business 
inputs – in this case, fuel used by businesses off road – is the principal 
source of this growth. Fuel tax is paid by business and later credited which 
accounts for its appearance on both sides of the Budget. As Treasury has 
noted repeatedly, fuel tax credits are not a subsidy and those who support 
the abolition of the scheme are arguing for industry to pay higher taxes. 
7 Assumptions on growth rates for productivity and economy are consistent 
with long-term forecasts contained in the 2010 Intergeneration Report 
released by Treasury.
8 As detailed in the Macroeconomics 2010-11 Budget Bulletin, we believe that 
around $45 billion of the $70 billion in temporary GFC Mark I stimulus 
spending was wasted on uneconomic projects.
9 Australian Government, January 2013. 
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10 Jacob Greber, Australian Financial Review, 8 March 2013. 
11 Artificially low interest rates may spur sub-optimal infrastructure projects 
leading to misallocation of investment flows over the longer term. This 
tendency is acerbated where governments borrow to fund consumption 
decisions. The financial and social returns to government spending projects 
must exceed the long term cost of borrowing.
12 Each successive IGR has revealed a lower overall long-run burden for 
taxpayers. However, this has more to do with a relatively optimistic view 
about the strength of long-run commodity prices and nominal GDP, not a 
reduction in underlying spending pressures.
13 Australian Government, January 2010, Appendix A, Table A1.
14 Productivity Commission, 2005, xxxvi.
15 The relationship between budget flows, the public balance sheet and debt is 
examined in David Woods and Michael Xanthis, 2011, pp. 1-14.
16 Australian Government, December 2009, and National Commission of Audit, 
June 1996.
17 Gary Banks, 2009, p.3.
18 The accrual reforms of the late 1990s, while theoretically sensible, led to 
a decision to do away with program reporting. By the mid-2000s, the 
Budget Group of the Department of Finance had no sure way of explaining 
the policy drivers of variations in agency accounting data. Since then the 
situation has been remedied, but this data is still not released to the public. 
19 Some of the program information can be found in agency budget 
documentation and annual reports, but there is no single statement  
which brings together all this information in a straightforward way that  
is accessible to the general public. 
20 Anthony Makin, 1998, pp. 419-25.
21 Blair Comley, et al, 2002 and Yong Hong Yan and Shane Brittle, 2010.
22 See, for example, Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna, 1998, pp. 487–545 and 
Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna, 2010, pp. 35-68.
23 Nicolaas Groenewold, 2012.
24 Lei Lei Song and John Freebairn, 2006, pp. 35–46. 
25 Owen Covick, 1990, p. 197. Former Hawke Government Finance Minister Peter 
Walsh was legendary among Finance Department staff for by-passing 
senior management and calling middle-level and junior departmental staff 
directly to get the full story on various issues.
77
26 Macroeconomics, 2012. BARRIE stands for Bayesian Australia and Regions 
Response to Impulse Economy.
27 See Graeme Davis and Stephen Anthony, 2002 and David Gruen and Amanda 
Sayegh, 2005, pp. 618-635.
28 See Benjamin Ford, 2005, pp. 63-74 and Tony McDonald, et al, 2000, pp. 51-79.
29 See Ross Garnaut, 2004. 
30 State budgets are just as exposed to cyclical revenue streams associated 
with property sales and mining through stamp duties on conveyances and 
royalty payments. Each state government could establish its own PBO 
which could oversight structural budget issues.
31 This section of the paper draws on the fiscal reform strategy outlined by  
Tony Cole and Karen Chester, The Australian, 31 October 2012.
32 The idea is developed in Stephen Anthony and Shane Evans, September 2010.
33 Industry Commission, 1994.
34 See Brian Toohey, 2008.
35 See Greg Coombs and Chris Roberts, 2007, pp. 1-16 for a primer on the issue.
 
ENDNOTES


Australia’s fiscal strategy is in need of an overhaul.  
In recent years, the Commonwealth has accumulated 
more than $170 billion in budget deficits, with 
another deficit now in prospect for 2012-13. This 
is despite windfall revenues since the start of the 
“China Boom” estimated at around $160 billion. 
Stephen Anthony sets out why Australia needs a new 
roadmap for fiscal sustainability and outlines some 
key budget reforms to secure this objective. Firstly, 
the nation’s fiscal strategy needs to be re-oriented 
around a structural budget measure to take account 
of movements in the business and commodity cycle. 
Secondly, reforms are needed to reverse the impact 
of unsustainable commitments made in the boom 
years and to meet future fiscal challenges.
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